Wearable robots are an emerging form of technology that allow organizations to combine the strength, precision, and performance of machines with the flexibility, intelligence, and problem-solving abilities of human wearers. Active exoskeletons are a type of wearable robot that gives wearers the ability to effortlessly lift up to 200 lbs., as well as perform other types of physically demanding tasks that would be too strenuous for most humans. Synchronization between exoskeleton suits and wearers is one of the most challenging requirements (...) to operate these technologies effectively. In this conceptual paper, we extend interpersonal adaption theory (IAT) to the exoskeleton context and explicate (a) the antecedents that are most likely to shape synchrony in human-exoskeleton interactions, (b) automatic and strategic synchrony as adaptive behaviors in human-exoskeleton interactions, and (c) outcome variables that are especially important in these processes. Lastly, we offer a discussion of key methodological challenges for measuring synchrony in human-exoskeleton interactions and offer a future research agenda for this important area. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: The Teleological Conception of the Practicable Good Human Function The Final Account of Human Good Conclusions Acknowledgments Notes References Further reading.

It is the famous first thesis of Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ that we should lay aside moral philosophy—indeed ‘ banish ethics totally from our minds’! —‘until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology’. By a ‘philosophy of psychology’ I understand Anscombe to mean grammatical investigations into various psychological concepts that hold the key to ethics. Anscombe herself instances ‘action’, ‘intention’, ‘pleasure’, ‘wanting’ . Without such an understanding, she thinks we will simply go astray.

Wisdom is to have correct views of the goods and bads of human life, and of their relative worth and standing: to understand how to navigate one’s way through these, in the situations in which one finds oneself, so as always to end in a correct judgment of how best to act—successfully, wisely. Lacking it, one is in danger of living a life in some way bad or defective. It may be a really corrupt, wicked life. Or it may be (...) simply a wasted one, where the agent squanders talents and time, without doing anything so terribly bad, certainly not to others. Admittedly, we can perhaps speak of the wicked as in a certain way shallow, although that would need elaboration ; less contentiously, we can speak of the unjust life of an unjust person as one wasted. Our talk of waste, etc., is typically more particular– where the issues are rather with idleness, triviality, and superficiality, with failures to appreciate, pursue, or be moved by, things of real human worth: it points to a more specific range of defects and misjudgements of worth, etc. This paper explores the notions of depth and shallowness as they figure in Foot’s reflections on the good, and then considers the implications of these notions for our understanding of what it is to live well or badly and what it is to have lived happily or unhappily. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Initial Survey: The Role of the Human Excellences in Aristotle's Practical Philosophy The Nature of Virtue and the Doctrine of the Middle/Mean (DOM) Notes Bibliography Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: The first phase (1950s to mid‐1960s): the Wittgensteinian defence of the possibility of naturalism The second phase (1970s): unease over morality and the rejection of (2) The third phase (1980s–1990s): rejecting (3); objective morality, objectivity rationality, and the facts of human life.

Philippa Foot is one of the most original and widely respected philosophers of our time; her work has exerted a lasting influence on the development of moral philosophy. In tribute to her, twelve leading philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic have contributed essays exploring the various topics in moral philosophy to which she has made a distinctive contribution--virtue ethics, naturalism, non-cognitivism, relativism, categorical requirements, and the role of rationality in morality.

The Teachings of the Odd-Eyed One: A Study and Translation of the Vīrūpakṣapañcāśikā with the Commentary of Vidyācakravartin, by David Peter Lawrence, provides a critical translation and a philosophical and historical introduction to a work of the nondualistic Śaiva tradition of Kashmir, the Virūpakṣapañcasikha (VAP) with a commentary (Vivṛti) by Vidyācakravartin. The text was composed sometime during the twelfth century, probably in Kashmir judging from the Śārada manuscripts that remain, the terminus a quo being suggested by the use the (...) text makes of Abhinavagupta (ca. 950-1020 C.E.) and the terminus ad quem being the twelfth-century Mahārtha-mañjarīparimala by Maheśvarānanda, who quotes it. The text proclaims .. (shrink)

This fitting Festschrift contains twelve essays by students, colleagues and friends of Philippa Foot, all of them leading figures in philosophy. Some deal directly and even centrally with Foot’s own work, the others with topics she has herself written on and in a manner relatively sympathetic to what she has said about those topics. Foot’s interests in ethics have been fairly wide-ranging, and that fact is well reflected in the essays of the present volume. Elizabeth Anscombe writes on ‘Practical Inference’; (...) Simon Blackburn on ‘The Flight to Reality’; Rosalind Hursthouse on ‘Applying Virtue Ethics’; Anthony Kenny on ‘Philippa Foot on Double Effect’; Gavin Lawrence on ‘The Rationality of Morality’; John McDowell on ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’; Warren Quinn on ‘Putting Rationality in its Place’; David Sachs on ‘Notes on Unfairly Gaining More: Pleonexia’; Thomas Scanlon on ‘Fear of Relativism’; Michael Thompson on ‘The Representation of Life’; David Wiggins on ‘Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty’; and Bernard Williams on ‘Acts and Omissions: Doing and Not Doing’. A short review cannot hope to do justice to all the interesting (and controversial) material to be found in these dedicatory essays. And rather than attempt to discuss even two or three of them, I think it better to choose a single one for closer consideration, namely, Warren Quinn’s rich and fascinating critique of subjectivist/instrumentalist views of practical reason. (shrink)

Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn.

Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn.

This volume of essays in honour of Philippa Foot constitutes a high quality Festschrift. There is no doubt that Philippa Foot's career is worthy of such a volume. She is one of the most influential philosophers of the past few decades and her work has given rise to, and seeded, much debate in contemporary moral philosophy. She has written on a wide variety of topics — virtue ethics, the doctrine of double effect, naturalism, and practical reasoning. The essays in this (...) volume touch on all of these issues. They are written by such distinguished philosophers as G. E. M. Anscombe, Simon Blackburn, Rosalind Hursthouse, Anthony Kenny, Gavin Lawrence, John McDowell, Warren Quinn, David Sachs, T. M. Scanlon, Michael Thompson, David Wiggins, and Bernard Williams. They all succeed in honouring Professor Foot's work. Given space considerations, and considering the forum for this review, I will focus on those essays that are of most relevance to consequentialism. (shrink)

Twelve essays explore the philosophy of science in general and the physical sciences in particular A common theme unites all twelve essays: In discussing the ...

The first edition of Blindsight, written by Lawrence Weiskrantz was an important and highly cited account of studies of the phenomenon - Blindsight. The updated edition retains the original text of the first edition, but brings the book up to date with developments in this area in the past decade.

The tendency to reciprocate – to return good for good and evil for evil – is a potent force in human life, and the concept of reciprocity is closely connected to fundamental notions of ‘justice’, ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’, ‘gratitude’ and ‘equality’. In _Reciprocity_, first published in 1986,_ _Lawrence Becker presents a sustained argument about reciprocity, beginning with the strategy for developing a moral theory of the virtues. He considers the concept of reciprocity in detail, contending that it is a basic (...) virtue that provides the basis for parental authority, obligations to future generations, and obedience to law. Throughout the first two parts of the book, Becker intersperses short pieces of his own narrative fiction to enrich reflection on the philosophical arguments. The final part is devoted to extensive bibliographical essays, ranging over anthropology, psychology, political theory and law, as well as the relevant ethics and political philosophy. (shrink)

Critics have charged that Heidegger's account of authenticity is morally nihilistic, that his fundamental ontology is either egocentric or chauvinistic; and many see Heidegger's turn to Nazism in 1933 as following logically from an indifference, and even hostility, to "otherness" in the premises of his early philosophy. In_ The Fragile "We": Ethical Implications of Heidegger's "Being and Time,"_ Lawrence Vogel presents three interpretations of authentic existence--the existentialist, the historicist, and the cosmopolitan--each of which is a plausible version of the (...) personal ideal depicted in _Being and Time._ He then draws parallels between these interpretations and three moments in the contemporary liberal-communitarian debate over the relationship of the "I" and the "We." His book contributes both to a diagnosis of what there is about _Being and Time_ that invites moral nihilism and to a sense of how fundamental ontology might be recast so that "the other" is accorded an appropriate place in an account of human existence. (shrink)

Embodied cognition emphasizes the importance of the body to cognition, but what is the nature of this importance? For some advocates, the body provides a computational resource within the context of a larger cognitive system. For others, the body constrains cognition, such that differently embodied organisms will differ cognitively as well. I examine these distinct conceptions of embodiment, defending the greater interest of the second. I argue as well that judgments of the body's significance in cognition do not, as contestants (...) on both sides of the debate often insist, depend on showing the body to be a constituent in cognition. (shrink)

The perceived split between 'analytical' and 'critical' traditions in mainstream philosophy is deeply outmoded and no longer relevant. In legal philosophy it persists. This article argues for an end to any treatment of one or other tradition as radically 'other'. It traces the division to a misunderstanding of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and its repercussions for normative legal theory. It demonstrates that a truly Heideggerian account of adjudication leads to similar normative conclusions to those of Ronald Dworkin. It further (...) demonstrates that Heidegger's conception of 'practical philosophy' is similar to that of John Finnis. The article concludes with some remarks about the broader implications for how we treat key figures in the history of ideas in all of our theoretical engagements. (shrink)

"This volume provides a long-needed anthology of major writings related to the subject of violence.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1956.